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Abstract 
 
The paper analyses the financial structure of German inward FDI. From a tax perspective, 
intra-company loans granted by the parent should be all the more strongly preferred over 
equity the lower the tax rate of the parent and the higher the tax rate of the German affiliate. 
From our study of a panel of more than 8,000 non-financial affiliates in Germany, we find 
only small effects of the tax rate of the foreign parent. However, our empirical results show 
that subsidiaries that on average are profitable react more strongly to changes in the German 
corporate tax rate than this is the case for less profitable firms. This gives support to the 
frequent concern that high German taxes are partly responsible for the high levels of intra-
company loans. Taxation, however, does not fully explain the high levels of intra-company 
borrowing. Roughly 60% of the cross-border intra-company loans turn out to be held by firms 
that are running losses. 
JEL Code: F23, H25. 
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1 Introduction 
There is widespread concern that multinational firms may evade a large portion of their 
statutory tax burden by shifting income out of high-tax jurisdictions. While such a 
concern is certainly not restricted to Germany, the high statutory rates of corporate tax 
in Germany – at least until the recent tax reform in 2001 – make it most likely that the 
country is particularly prone to this problem. Throughout the 1990s Germany had the 
highest tax rate on retained corporate profits (including average local taxes) among 
OECD countries.  
Income shifting may take the form of prices that depart from arms-length 
conditions and may imply excessive management and overhead fees, the setting of non-
market interest rates within a group etc. Besides setting tax-efficient transfer prices on 
intra-firm trade, multinationals may also use the financial structure to minimise taxes 
and thereby allocate interest deductions to highly taxed affiliates for which this tax 
shield is most valuable. In this paper we want to explore to what extent the financial 
structure of German inward foreign direct investment (FDI) is due to tax-saving 
behaviour.
1 During the 1990s the net German FDI inflow was financed to a large extent 
by intra-company debt incurred outside Germany. According to Deutsche Bundesbank 
(1993), 61.9% of the German inflow of FDI in 1990 and 1991 was financed by intra-
company loans, and this strong role of intra-company loans in German inward FDI has 
led to the suspicion that these loans are indeed encouraged by high German tax rates 
(Deutsche Bundesbank 1997, page 67f, Weichenrieder 1995, page 183). To the best of 
our knowledge this paper is the first attempt to look at this question using German firm-
level data on inward FDI.  
Our study is based on the Bundesbank FDI statistics that cover all foreign direct 
investments, which meet mild size requirements. Unlike most studies on FDI with non-
                                                 
1   For papers that provide evidence on tax motivated transfer pricing policies of multinationals see, for 
example, Grubert and Mutti (1991), Collins and Shackelford (1998), or Rousslang (1997).  
  1U.S. data, we can draw on micro data from 1989 – 2002 to study this question and a 
panel structure is available for the years 1996 – 2002.
2 
While there is a large number of studies on the tax effects on FDI, most are 
concerned with the effect of local taxes on the overall FDI inflow of a region.
3 There are 
only a few studies on the financial structure. Notable exceptions are studies by Altshuler 
and Grubert (2003), Jog and Tang (2001), and Desai, Foley, and Hines (2003a). 
Altshuler and Grubert consider a cross sample of US subsidiaries abroad and analyse 
the liability and asset side of these firms. The study shows an inverse relationship 
between the foreign tax rate and the amount of financial assets held abroad. On the 
liability side, a 1 percentage point increase in the foreign tax rate is associated with an 
increase of roughly .4 percentage point in the debt to total asset ratio. The paper by Jog 
und Tang looks at US and Canadian firms. The authors show that the reduction in the 
Canadian corporate tax rate in the late 1980s triggered a reduction in the debt ratio of 
Canadian affiliates. Finally, Desai, Foley, and Hines find for a panel of US-owned 
foreign firms that a 1 percentage point increase in the foreign corporate tax rate leads to 
an increase in the external debt to asset ratio of roughly .25 percentage point and an 
increase in internal borrowing of some .08 percentage point.  
In section 2 we will briefly discuss the tax arbitrage possibilities of multinational 
firms that consider alternative ways of financing their German investment. In Section 3 
the Deutsche Bundesbank FDI database is used to present descriptive statistics of 
financial structures of German inward FDI.
4 By identifying the home countries of 
foreign affiliates operating in Germany and employing the respective tax rate of the 
parent, we are able to proxy the global tax saving of a profitable firm that decides to 
distribute a euro of equity to its parent and to replace this euro by an intra-company loan 
granted by the parent. Section 4 develops the empirical model and presents the 
econometric results before section 5 concludes.  
Our empirical analysis of a huge panel of more than 8,000 firms provides 
evidence that supports the hypothesis that the financial structures of foreign affiliates in 
Germany are partly tax motivated. While we find that the corporate tax rate of the 
                                                 
2   For reasons of data protection the data before 1996 have been anonymised, and the panel structure has 
therefore been lost. 
3 For a detailed survey and meta study see Ederveen and de Mooij (2001). 
  2 parent has only a very limited impact on the financial structure of a German subsidiary, 
a significant effect of the German tax rate is visible. To identify this influence, we 
exploit the fact that unprofitable firms should be less affected by a change in the 
German corporate tax than profitable firms. Indeed, our results show that among 
German subsidiaries, which are directly held by a foreign investor, profitable firms react 
significantly different from non-profitable firms. When the German tax rate increases, 
profitable firms significantly increase the amount of intra-company debt compared to 
unprofitable firms.  
Besides tax incentives, our study identifies (low) profitability as a major factor 
that explains the diversity of intra-company loans. Roughly 60% of the cross-border 
intra-company debt turns out to be held by firms that are running losses and profitability 
turns out to be highly significant in our panel regressions of intra-company loans.  
2  The tax preferences for intra-company loans 
From a tax perspective, the incentives for a foreign parent to grant an interest bearing 
loan to a profitable German subsidiary will depend on the German tax rate at which the 
interest is deductible, on the one hand, and the tax rate at which the interest is taxable in 
the home country of the parent, on the other hand. 
To be more specific, consider the option of a German affiliate to use its profit to 
pay back an intra-company loan granted by the parent. Let  ,  ,  be the effective 
corporate tax rates on German retained earnings and on earnings that are distributed 
from the German subsidiary to the foreign parent and the rate at which the German 
affiliate can deduct interest paid to the parent. The latter rate may fall short of the rate 
on retained earnings since in Germany only half of the interest on medium and long-
term debt is deductible from the local trade tax (Gewerbesteuer). The rate   is an 
effective rate that is influenced by the German corporate tax on distributed profits, by 
the German withholding tax on dividends and by additional taxes in the home country 
of the parent if this country does not exempt foreign dividends.  
∗ τr
∗ τd
∗ τi
∗ τd
                                                                                                                                               
4 For a description of this database see Lipponer (2003). 
  3If the German affiliate pays back a loan of €1 today, the parent is able to distribute 
this €1 as a dividend to its own shareholders. This however, comes at a cost. To pay 
back a loan of €1, the German affiliate needs a pre-tax income of  ( )
∗ τ − r 1 1  euro. Since 
this sum is not available for profit distribution, the parent forgoes ( ) ( )
∗ τ − r
∗ τ − d 1 1  euro 
in dividends. Hence, the total change in dividends that the parent can pay today (before 
personal taxes of the shareholder of the parent) is given as 
( )
()
∗
∗
τ −
τ −
− ≡
r
d a
1
1
1  (1) 
There is, however, an additional effect on future dividends. Since the debt service 
of the affiliate drops by the tax deductible interest rate on the retired loan, dividends 
may rise by  ( )
∗ τ − i 1 i  in all future periods, where i is the nominal interest rate. Since 
these dividends are taxed at the rate for distributed profits rather than at the rate on 
retained earnings, the parent receives a stream of dividends of 
( ) ( ) ( )
∗ ∗ τ − ⋅ τ − r i i 1 1
∗ − τ d 1 , the cash value of which is 
( ) ( )
() () m i
i
b
r
d i
− ⋅ τ −
τ − ⋅ τ −
≡ ∗
∗ ∗
1 1
1 1 , (2) 
where  ( ) m − 1 i  is the discount rate applied by a shareholder of the parent.  
A third effect that has to be taken into account is that the parent in all future 
periods lacks the interest income on the retired euro. Denoting the parent firm's tax rate 
at which the interest is taxable by τ, the cash value of this effect amounts to  
()
() m i
i
c
−
τ −
≡
1
1  (3) 
Obviously, assuming constant tax rates and abstracting from taxes on capital 
gains, the profitability of the intra-company loan depends on the sign of ( ) c b a − + . If 
this sign is negative, intra-company loans dominate equity in the form of retained 
earnings as a source of finance for the German affiliate. One problem in international 
studies such as ours is that one can only speculate about the applicable tax rate m of the 
  4 final investor. We follow a standard assumption in the literature on the international cost 
of capital (OECD 1991) and assume that the final investor is tax exempt (m = 0). 
Consequently,  
( ) ( ) ( ) τ − τ − τ τ − = − + − =
∗ ∗ ∗
r i d c b a DIFF 1 1  (4) 
is an indicator of the tax dominance of intra-company loans over retained earnings of 
the German affiliate. It should be noted that DIFF is also the relevant indicator for the 
tax advantage of reducing the third-party debt of the German affiliate by €1 and 
increasing the third-party debt of the foreign parent by €1. In this case the capital market 
can be thought of as financing a back-to-back transaction with the affiliate and the 
parent. Moreoover, things are very similar if the corporation is considering a new equity 
injection by the parent or, alternatively, an intra-company loan to finance the subsidiary. 
Again, it can be shown that the relationship between the German and the foreign tax 
rates is crucial.
5  
The above arbitrage argument assumed that the parent and the German affiliate are 
profitable and do pay taxes. For German firms that are unprofitable, however, the right 
to deduct interest from the high taxed German tax base tends to be less valuable. At 
best, such a firm may be able to use a loss carry-backward or a loss carry-forward to 
decrease taxable income in other fiscal years. In the case of a loss carry-forward this 
comes at a cost as the loss carry forward is not interest bearing. The effective rate at 
which interest is deductible reduces. Conversely, if the parent firm, which receives the 
interest income, is running losses, then the effective tax rate may be lower than the 
statutory tax rate τ. Unfortunately, we do not know about the tax status of the parent so 
we cannot exploit such a difference in effective rates.  
From the above argument we have that the profit or loss position of the German 
affiliate changes the influence of the Germany tax rate since it may reduce the value of 
the interest deduction, but, given the profit or loss position of the parent, it does not 
change the effective tax rate at which interest income of the parent is taxed. This 
suggests to split up the variable DIFF into a German part and a foreign part when the 
                                                 
5 For an extensive discussion of the tax-induced financial preferences of multinational firms see Alworth 
(1988), Keen (1991) or Weichenrieder (1995). 
  5profit or loss position of the German subsidiaries is considered in the empirical 
implementation. Firms that do pay taxes are expected to react more strongly to a 
German tax rate change than firms that are in a loss position.  
3 Descriptive  statistics 
Despite its recently sluggish growth rates, Germany is still one of the main recipients of 
inward FDI. For end-2000 the OECD FDI statistics record an inward stock of FDI of 
€482 billion for Germany compared €277 billion for France, €121 billion for Italy and 
€479 billion for the UK. The present section gives information on the overall financing 
patterns of the German FDI stock and additional stylised facts. We will concentrate on 
non-financial firms (excluding banks, pure holding companies, and insurance 
companies) that are separately incorporated in Germany (dropping branches), and we 
will exclude investment in the government and not-for-profit sectors.  
In its yearly survey of the stock of German inbound FDI, the Bundesbank collects 
data on the liability side of the balance sheets such as paid-up capital, capital reserves, 
profits and losses carried forward, and debt, including loans received from affiliated 
firms inside and outside Germany. The prime purpose of the data collection is to give a 
picture of the cross-border ownership of firms and the stocks of FDI in Germany. A 
somewhat unusual feature of the balance sheets collected by the Bundesbank is that they 
contain the yearly profit after taxes but before dividend distributions as a separate part 
of the equity of the firm. Therefore the balance sheets provide information on current 
profits despite the fact that there is no explicit profit and loss statement. On the asset 
side, data are available on fixed assets and intangibles, financial assets and working 
capital.  
For each firm in the sample we can identify the foreign country of the investor, 
which may not be the ultimate investor but a foreign holding or intermediate company, 
and the share that this investor has in the German affiliate. An important distinction in 
the German data is the one between directly and indirectly held inward FDI. An indirect 
participation applies if the German affiliate is held by a German company that, in turn, 
is owned by a foreign investor. A direct participation is defined as one where the 
German affiliate is directly owned by a foreign investor.  
  6 Figure 1. Main investors by country  
a) Directly held affiliates  b) Indirectly held affiliates 
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Annotation: Investor countries by relative contribution to balance sheet total of directly and indirectly 
held foreign affiliates in Germany. United States (US), Netherlands (NL), Japan (JP), Switzerland (CH), 
France (FR), United Kingdom (UK), Italy (IT), Austria (OE), Denmark (DK), Spain (ES).
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank database. Subsample of non-financial firms.  
As has been found for US data, most of the FDI is wholly-owned. In 2002, for 
example, almost 70% of the directly held subsidiaries had only one foreign investor. 
Figure 1 shows how the total assets of the affiliates can be attributed to investors from 
different countries. Allthough the investors of German inbound FDI are rather unevenly 
spread out across investing countries, there remains a rather large number of 
investments coming from smaller countries. Figure 1 shows a dominance of US 
investors, which has seemingly declined during the 1990s. This may be partly due, 
however, to the increased use of (often Dutch) intermediate holdings (cf. also Desai, 
Foley and Hines 2003b, Mintz 2003).  
  7Table 1. Descriptive statistics, aggregated sample (2001) 
 Direct  Indirect 
Balance sheet item  Total 
(€ billion) 
Fraction of 
balance sheet
Total 
(€ billion) 
Fraction of 
balance sheet
Paid-up capital  19.200  10.6945  20.600  8.7026 
Capital  reserves  39.400 21.9686 28.400 11.9889 
Surplus reserves  2.151  1.1991  6.498  2.7394 
Profit/loss  carry-forward  -10.900  -6.0962 -2.459 -1.0367 
Current profits  -1.515  -0.8447  1.424  0.6003 
Debt  94.300  52.5342 126.000 53.1273 
  Liabilities to affiliated 
companies 
47.200 26.3162 75.900 32.0105 
 in  Germany  11.300  6.3081  58.800  24.8007 
 outside  Germany  35.000  19.5071  15.400  6.4763 
Other  liabilities  36.900 20.5447 56.600 23.8784 
Balance sheet total  179.000  1  237.000  1 
 
Let us now turn to the financial structure. Table 1 gives the crude picture. In 2001 
the balance sheet total of directly held firms amounted to €179 billion.
6 About 11% of 
this was financed by paid-up capital and some 23% consisted of retained earnings from 
previous periods (capital and surplus reserves). On aggregate, loss carry-forwards 
amounted to roughly 6%. Debt and other liabilities made up for roughly 73% of the 
aggregated balance sheets. The financing pattern changes when we turn to indirectly 
held firms, i.e. corporations that are not directly held by a foreign company but held via 
an intermediate company located within Germany. The two types of firms differ with 
respect to the capital reserves, the loss carry-forwards and the liabilities to affiliated 
companies. While overall debt makes up for roughly 53% of the balance sheets in both 
cases, indirectly held firms tend to owe more to affiliated companies. Moreover, the 
structure of these liabilities differs between the two types of firms. Indirectly held firms 
tend to owe most of this (25% of the balance sheet) to affiliate companies within 
Germany and directly held firms owe most of it (20%) to affiliated firms outside 
Germany. This reflects the fact that indirectly held firms are owned by German 
intermediate companies that can act as financial clearing institutions for their 
  8 subsidiaries. Conversely, directly held subsidiaries are held by a foreign firm or foreign 
holding company and are less likely to face an affiliated company in Germany. By 
international standards, the amount of cross-country intra-company debt looks large. For 
comparison, Desai, Foley, and Hines (2003a) report that US-owned foreign affiliates, on 
a worldwide average, finance 8% of their total assets by borrowing from their US 
parent. Similarly, Altshuler and Grubert (2003) report for a sample of 5,981 US-owned 
non-financial subsidiaries that loans from stockholders amounted to roughly 10% of 
total assets in 1996. German non-financial FDI abroad is also financed by intra-
company loans to a much lesser extent. In 2001 the liabilities of those firms to German 
affiliates (including their German parent) amounted to some 8.7% of the balance sheet 
total and the liabilities to non-German affiliates were 8.3%.  
The summary statistics of Table 1 do not, of course, reflect the possibly large 
heterogeneity in the data across firms and across investor countries. Therefore, Figure 2 
gives some information on firm heterogeneity. Each of the 12 graphs (6 for direct and 6 
for indirect participations) contains 5 lines. The bold line represents the respective 
financing ratio of the median firm, i.e. 50% of the firms have a lower financing ratio. 
The other curves represent the financing ratios for the 5%, 25%, 75% and 95% centile 
firms.  
Several features are remarkable. As shown in the first graph of Figure 2, after the 
year 1996 more than 5% of the firms had paid-up capital that amounted to more than 
100% of total assets. Technically, this is possible if there are negative items on the 
liability side of the balance sheet such as loss carry-forwards or current losses.  
                                                                                                                                               
6 Due to an increase in the thresholds for the reporting requirement, the year 2001 is somewhat more 
representative for our data than the year 2002.  
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Figure 2 cont'd   
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Annotation: In each graph, the bold line indicates the respective financial ratio of the median firm. The 
two lines below the median line characterise the financial ratio of the 5th and 25th centile firms, the two 
lines above the median ratio indicate the 75th and 95th centiles. Each of the left hand diagrams refers to 
the subsample of firms that are directly held by a foreign firm, while the graphs on the right hand refer to 
firms in Germany that are foreign held via a German company.  
Indeed, from 1993 onwards, directly held affiliates experienced growing loss 
carry-forwards. The value of a firm that represents the fifth centile in terms of this 
balance sheet item has doubled from 1995 to 2002 and amounted to 180% of the 
balance sheet total at the end of the period, implying negative equity. For 5% of the 
indirectly held firms loss carry-forwards still exceeded 44% of the balance sheet. From 
1993, extreme outliers are present also when we consider current net-of-tax profits of 
directly and indirectly held firms. In 1995, 5% of the directly held affiliates had a 
current loss that exceeded 21% of their balance sheet and, by the year 2002, 5% of the 
firms had a yearly loss that amounted to at least 44% of their balance sheet total. In the 
case of indirectly held affiliates, losses for the fifth centile reached 10% of the balance 
sheet total in 1995 and 13% in 2001. It should be noted that a growing number of firms 
are running huge losses in consecutive years. While the huge number of unprofitable 
  11operations is surprising, it is also remarkable that a large number of firms report exactly 
zero net-of-tax profits and this holds true for the median directly and indirectly held 
firms in almost any year from 1989 to 2001.  
Turning to total debt, in recent years 5% of the directly held affiliates have had a 
share of debt in balance sheet total that exceeded unity. As with paid-up capital, this is 
possible in the case of negative current profits and/or negative profit carry-forwards. 
Finally, for at least 5% of the directly held subsidiaries liabilities to affiliated firms 
outside Germany account for more than 100% of the balance sheet total after 1995. For 
the fifth centile, the fraction is growing and was 1.24 in 2002. Interestingly, the 
development of the internal debt in this centile closely corresponds to the development 
of losses for the fifth centile. Quite obviously, for some firms current losses are covered 
by intra-company loans instead of new equity.  
To sum up the above description, in the second half of the 1990s the financial 
structure of a sizeable fraction of the inward FDI projects in Germany was strongly 
influenced by large losses and this holds particularly for directly held firms. In many 
cases losses were accumulating over time and to some extent intra-company loans were 
used to finance these losses. While corporate losses seem to play a huge role in 
explaining the financial structures of some firms, the next sections will analyse what 
role is left for tax differences between Germany and the home country of the investor. 
Before we will do so, however, we will briefly introduce our tax rate data.  
Figure 3 gives an impression of the distribution of DIFF, as defined in section 2, 
for the full sample of all directly and indirectly held affiliates in our data set with all 
years pooled.
7 The data set contains tax information from up to 69 countries and digests 
information on the foreign corporate taxes including average local taxes, the German 
withholding tax on dividends and the German corporate tax (including average local 
taxes) against which firms can deduct interest expenses.
8 In cases, in which a German 
firm is owned by several investors from foreign countries, we use average values of 
                                                 
7 In those cases where the affiliate is owned by foreign investors from more than one country we calculate 
DIFF as a weighted average of the individual country values (weights taken from the ownership of 
shares). 
8 In selected cases, we decided to depart from headline corporate taxes in investor countries due to special 
regimes. For example, a huge fraction of German subsidiaries is held via Dutch holdings. Since 1997, 
these holding can allocate 80 per cent of their interest income to special provisions, which in effect 
exempts 80 per cent of the income. Therefore we adjusted the Dutch tax rate accordingly.  
  12 DIFF, with the fractions of the ownership stakes taken as weights. Rather than showing 
the histogram itself, Figure 3 gives a Kernel density estimate, which makes it somewhat 
easier to compare the distribution with a normal distribution. For a very large share of 
the observations DIFF is positive implying that for tax reasons it pays for a profitable 
multinational to substitute intra-company debt for equity (i.e. to distribute retained 
earnings). But owing to the German split rate system of the corporate tax with its 
smaller rate on distributed profits and the limited tax deductibility of interest against the 
local taxes for some countries during the 1990s, DIFF was (partly) negative. Italy and 
Japan are examples. When we look at the time variation in the tax rate data, 62 per cent 
of the home countries in our sample did experience corporate tax rate changes during 
the period 1996-2002 and the average standard deviation of the national corporate tax 
rate is some two percentage points.  
Figure 3. The distribution of DIFF 
 
  134 Empirical  Evidence 
The role of taxes on the financial structure has been widely analysed in empirical 
studies, but most studies are concerned with national firms and national tax systems.
9 
While the older literature has generally failed to find significant effects on corporate 
financing, recent studies of national firms have been more successful in identifying tax 
effects. MacKie–Mason (1990) looks at the marginal source of finance as a function of 
the corporate tax rate by looking at the loss carry-forward position of firms. For firms 
with high loss carry-forwards the tax deductibility of interest has a lower value than for 
profitable firms. MacKie–Mason shows for a sample of US corporations that firms with 
high loss carry-forwards indeed use less debt at the margin. Givoly et al (1992) use a 
similar method and use the natural experiment of the US 1986 tax reform act. Gentry 
(1994) compares US firms that operate in special industries and can avoid the double 
taxation under the US corporate tax system with other firms that are subject to double 
taxation of corporate profits. Indeed the first group of corporations shows a significantly 
different financing behaviour. Graham (1999) argues that empirically the tax rate of the 
personal investor plays a role in corporate financing decisions. Gordon and Lee (1999) 
exploit the fact that in the US smaller corporations are granted a lower corporate tax rate 
and find a significant effect of this lower rate. Finally, Gropp (2002) shows a sizeable 
tax effect on the financing of marginal corporate investment by exploiting local tax 
differentials for German firms. 
So far, there is rather limited evidence on the empirical effects of international 
taxation on the financing of multinationals. Three notable exceptions have been 
described in the introduction, and all of them identify effects for US-owned subsidiaries.  
In this study we want to address the question of how tax rate differences between 
the home country of an investor and Germany influence the financial structure of 
German inward FDI. Therefore, the endogenous variable that is of foremost interest to 
us is the amount of intra-company loans granted to a German affiliate by its foreign 
investor divided by the balance sheet total (LIABOUTGER). As we cannot exactly 
distinguish from which country a loan is granted we employ the working hypothesis that 
                                                 
9 There is a huge theoretical literature on the determinants of the financial structure of corporations. A 
useful survey of this literature is given in Harris and Raviv (1991).  
  14 all debt from non-German affiliated companies comes from the parent and the 
applicable tax rates for this country are taken into account.  
Table 2. Determinants of cross-border intra-company loans 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Directly  held 
affiliates  
Indirectly held 
affiliates  
Directly held 
affiliates  
Indirectly held 
affiliates  
DIFF -0.024 0.021     
 (0.016)  (0.008)***     
CT     0.003  -0.007 
    (0.014)  (0.011) 
GERTAX     0.137  -0.014 
    (0.054)**  (0.007)** 
PROFITABILITY  -0.302 -0.073 -0.293 -0.062 
 (0.033)***  (0.025)***  (0.033)***  (0.027)** 
SIZE 0.053 0.001 0.054 0.001 
 (0.006)***  (0.001)  (0.006)***  (0.001) 
COLLATERAL  -0.066 -0.066 -0.064 -0.065 
  (0.018)*** (0.012)*** (0.018)*** (0.012)*** 
Observations  25,540 15,090 25,821 15,318 
Number of firms  4,985  3,314  4,985  3,314 
R-squared  0.79 0.48 0.78 0.48 
Notes: Dependent variable: liabilities to affiliated companies outside Germany over the balance sheet 
total. Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Unbalanced sample for the years from 1996 to 2001. Firm fixed-effects (within) estimator. Standard 
errors are corrected for clustering across country observations and for heteroscedasticity. A full set of 
time dummies has been used; coefficient estimates are not reported. We eliminated outliers by excluding 
observations for which the exogenous variables PROFITABILITY, COLLATERAL and SIZE were 
either in their two lowest or in their two highest percentiles. We also excluded firms that on average 
across all observations had a debt to asset ratio of unity or larger. To be included observations had to be 
consecutive for at least three years. Total assets are used on both sides of the equation in the denominators 
of LIABOUTGER, COLLATERAL and PROFITABILITY. Since this poses potential endogeneity 
problems, we also used instrumental variables approaches (using a GMM model) but the test statistics 
always rejected the validity of the available instruments. Therefore the GMM results are not reported. 
Table 2 summarises our findings for the liabilities to non-German affiliated 
companies (cross-border intra-company loans). Since the Breusch-Pagan and the 
Hausman tests reject the use of random-effects models, we report only the results for 
fixed-effects models. Because of the quite different importance of cross-border intra-
company loans for directly and indirectly held affiliates we analyse them in separate 
subsamples. Columns (1) and (2) report the results for a model in which the variable 
DIFF summarizes the tax incentives to borrow from the parent. From section 2, we 
should expect that DIFF is positively correlated with the amount in intra-company 
loans. The model behind columns (3) and (4) splits up the effects of the foreign tax rate 
and the German tax rate. A larger foreign tax rate should lead to heavier taxation of 
  15interest paid by the affiliate and should make cross-border loans less attractive. We 
therefore expect a negative coefficient. Conversely, the higher the German rate, the 
higher is the value of interest deductions and the more cross-border loans should be 
expected. The problem here is that the German statutory tax rate is the same for all 
firms in our sample. In a model with fixed time effects the respective coefficient 
therefore cannot be identified. To overcome this problem we split our sample into a 
subsample of firms that on average show a positive profitability and into a second 
subsample of firms that have zero or negative average profitability across observations. 
A dummy PROFIT takes on the value one for a firm in the first subsample and the value 
zero, otherwise.
10 The variable GERTAX is the product of this dummy and the German 
corporate tax rate as it is relevant for interest deductions. As has been argued in section 
2, profitable (i.e. taxable) firms can be expected to react more strongly with their 
leverage decision upon a German tax rate change. Therefore we expect a positive 
coefficient of the variable GERTAX, which also has a sizeable variation over the years 
since the German tax rate relevant for interest deductions has come down from 59.65% 
in 1996 to 33.07% in 2002.  
Columns (1) and (2) use the variable DIFF, columns (3) and (4) use CT and 
GERTAX. The tax variable DIFF is found to be non-significant for directly held firms 
in column (1). This result changes if we look at indirectly held firms in column (2). 
Here the coefficient is significant, but is still economically small. It suggests a .2 
percentage point increase in the ratio of cross-border loans to total assets if the home 
country rate increases by 10 percentage points.  
A possible reason for this weak correlation is that a large percentage of the firms 
in our sample have negative profits in consecutive years. The models in columns (3) and 
(4) report the results for variables CT and GERTAX and try to overcome this problem. 
We find that the influence of the parent's home tax rate, CT, is still insignificant for 
directly and indirectly held affiliates. Turning to the coefficient GERTAX we find a 
significant and sizeable effect for directly held firms that receive the major part of cross-
border intra-company loans. The coefficient implies that an increase of the German tax 
rate of 10 percentage points increases the fraction of cross-border loans to balance sheet 
                                                 
10 For 68 per cent (42 per cent) of the directly (indirectly) held firms in the sample of Table 2, PROFIT 
takes on the value one.  
  16 total by some 1.37 percentages points relative to the control group that on average 
shows non-positive profitability. Surprisingly, we get a negative sign of GERTAX when 
analyzing the indirectly held affiliates in column (4), which from the descriptive 
statistics in section 3 receive much less cross-border loans. While it is statistically 
significant, the coefficient for these firms is very small in economic terms.  
Drawing on the empirical model of Rajan and Zingales (1995), we add several 
other variables that may play a role for the financial structure. A large ratio of fixed 
assets to total assets can be interpreted as a sign for good collateral. This may reduce the 
agency cost of borrowing and may increase firm value in the event of illiquidity of the 
firm. This in turn should increase the availability of third-party debt and may reduce the 
need for loans by the parent. This leads us to introduce the ratio of fixed assets and 
intangibles to total assets as the explanatory variable COLLATERAL.
11 
COLLATERAL has a significantly negative coefficient for all but one subsample 
(profitable indirectly owned affiliates). This is in line with a substitution theory between 
intra-company debt and third-party debt and the hypothesis that collateral increases the 
access to third-party debt.  
Access to third-party debt may also vary with firm size. If larger corporations are 
more diversified than smaller ones, the former may have a smaller default risk and 
better access to outside debt (reducing the need for intra-company debt). But, of course, 
larger corporations may simply be better equipped with equity and may need less third-
party debt as well as less intra-company loans. In any case, size may matter, and we 
therefore introduce the right-hand variable SIZE, defined as the log of total assets 
(balance sheet total). The coefficient for size turns out to be insignificant for the sample 
of indirectly held firms but significantly positive for the directly held affiliates, which 
may reflect that large, mature firms have a better equity base.  
While the significance of the variable GERTAX is evidence that tax 
considerations do matter for the size of cross-border intra-company loans, this may not 
be the full story. Indeed, only some 55% of the German affiliates are financed by cross-
border intra-company loans. As we have seen from the descriptive statistics, a sizeable 
fraction of the foreign subsidiaries in Germany run huge losses and intra-company loans 
  17seemed to be an important instrument to keep those firms alive. In total, 60% of all 
cross-border intra-company loans are granted to affiliates that are in a loss position and 
therefore have a limited benefit from interest deductibility. This alone suggests a strong 
role of cross-border loans in covering losses. Another piece of evidence for the role of 
losses is the coefficient of the variable PROFITABILITY in Table 2, which is defined 
as the ratio of current profits net of taxes to total assets. We find a significant negative 
and sizeable correlation between PROFITABILITY and cross-border intra-company 
loans for directly held firms. The marginal effects reported in Table 2 indicate that a 
reduction in profits of 1% of the balance sheet total leads to additional cross-border 
loans of .3% of the balance sheet total. While PROFITABILITY is also significant in 
explaining the intra-company loans for indirectly held firms, the estimated coefficients 
are much smaller. This reflects the fact that for indirectly held firms a German 
intermediate company is available to provide short-term finance and cross-border loans 
are largely redundant.  
As mentioned in section 2, a close substitute to an intra-company loan is to 
increase third party debt of the high-tax affiliate in Germany and to reduce third party 
debt of the parent firm.
12 For parent firms in low-tax jurisdictions (high DIFF) debt is 
less advantageous from a tax saving perspective and parents may use less leverage. This 
in turn allows them to increase the leverage in high tax affiliates (like German ones) 
without unduly increasing the multinational's overall leverage. Unfortunately, we are 
not in a position to use the balance sheets of parent firms to find additional evidence for 
such countervailing effects abroad. But as pointed out in section 3, the tax preferences 
for such a transaction should again be influenced by our variable DIFF and the tax 
attractiveness of third-party for financing German subsidiaries should be influenced by 
this variable. We therefore re-ran the regressions presented in table 2, but using third-
party debt to balance sheet total as the endogenous variable (Table 3).  
For the directly held affiliates (column (1)) DIFF has the expected sign and is 
significant, although the estimated coefficient is small. For indirectly held firms 
(column (2)) the coefficient turns out to be insignificant. If we instead use the variables 
                                                                                                                                               
11 Unfortunately, the Bundesbank data pool fixed assets and intangibles and fixed assets cannot be 
identified separately.  
12 For a discussion of similar financing strategies see Altshuler and Grubert (2003). 
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CT and GERTAX, these results turn around: now the variable GERTAX has the 
expected and significant sign for indirectly held affiliates but is insignificant for directly 
held firms. The home country tax rate CT is insignificant in both cases. Together this 
provides only limited evidence that tax rates play a major role in the decision to raise 
outside debt.  
PROFITABILITY again turns out to have a highly significant influence. The 
variable SIZE is positively correlated with third-party debt, which suggests that larger 
firms have better access to third party debt. COLLATERAL is significant and positively 
correlated with third-party debt in the case of directly held firms but is insignificant for 
indirectly held affiliates.  
Table 3. Determinants of third-party debt 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Directly  held 
affiliates  
Indirectly held 
affiliates  
Directly held 
affiliates  
Indirectly held 
affiliates  
DIFF 0.034 0.013     
 (0.014)**  (0.020)     
ACT     -0.020  0.035 
    (0.014)  (0.025) 
GERTAX     0.068  0.036 
    (0.043)  (0.018)** 
PROFITABILITY  -0.222 -0.120 -0.222 -0.146 
  (0.031)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.033)*** 
SIZE 0.034 0.018 0.034 0.018 
  (0.009)*** (0.003)*** (0.009)*** (0.003)*** 
COLLATERAL  0.110 -0.029 0.103 -0.033 
 (0.026)***  (0.021)  (0.027)***  (0.020) 
Observations  25,339 14,923 25,616 15,143 
Number of firms  4,927  3,284  4,927  3,284 
R-squared  0.80 0.57 0.80 0.57 
Notes: Dependent variable: liabilities to affiliated companies outside Germany over the balance sheet 
total. Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Unbalanced sample for the years from 1996 to 2001. Firm fixed-effects (within) estimator. Standard 
errors are corrected for clustering across country observations and for heteroscedasticity. A full set of 
time dummies has been used; coefficient estimates are not reported. We eliminated outliers by excluding 
observations for which the exogenous variables PROFITABILITY, COLLATERAL and SIZE were 
either in their two lowest or in their two highest percentiles. We also excluded observations for which the 
endogenous variable was in the two highest percentiles. To be included observations had to be 
consecutive for at least three years.    20 
5 Discussion 
The paper has analysed the financial structure of German inbound FDI in the non-
financial sector. On average, some 25% of the balance sheet total of these firms was 
financed by intra-company loans in 2001 and for affiliates that are directly held by a 
foreign investor, cross-border intra-company loans account for 20% percent of balance 
sheet total. Tax rate differentials are frequently named as a possible explanation for this 
strong role of intra-company loans in financing foreign subsidiaries in Germany. If the 
interest on the loan is received in a low-tax country but is tax deductible in high-tax 
Germany, this financial instrument can produce a global tax saving for the 
multinational, the amount of which decreases in the foreign country's tax rate. Therefore 
we should expect that cross-border intra-company loans are used more extensively 
when the parent is located in a low-tax country. Based on a panel of 8,000 firms 
operating in Germany, we could provide only limited evidence that the home tax rate of 
the foreign parent is important for the amount of intra-company loans. Possibly, our 
analysis here suffers from lacking information on whether the foreign parent is in a loss 
position. In any case, the failure to identify sizeable effects of the home country tax rate 
does not imply that foreign affiliates that operate in Germany do not use financial 
strategies to save taxes. Our empirical results have shown that subsidiaries that on 
average are profitable do react more strongly to the German tax rate than other 
subsidiaries. This strongly suggests that the size of the German tax rate does play a role 
for the leverage decision. Considering third-party debt in the hand of Germany-based 
affiliates our results show a significant effect of the German tax rate when we look at 
indirectly held affiliates but not when we look at directly held affiliates.  
Leverage decisions of foreign subsidiaries are certainly not exclusively steered by 
tax considerations, although these considerations do seem to play a role. Another 
important factor of cross-border intra-company loans is (low) profitability. The majority 
of cross-border intra-company loans are received by loss-making subsidiaries. In our 
panel analysis we find that for directly held foreign affiliates a reduction in profits by 
1% of the balance sheet is associated with an increase of cross-border loans by .3% of 
balance sheet total. Profitability, besides the different use of cross-border intra-company 
loans, is another area where directly and indirectly held firms differ starkly. Foreign-  21
owned firms that are held via a German intermediate company show a much lower 
variation in profitability than do directly held affiliates and a majority of the indirectly 
held firms shows virtually zero profitability. Further analysis of these differences may 
potentially lead to additional insights into the tax avoidance strategies of multinational 
firms but are left for future research.  
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